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FOREWORD
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief
of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of
professional· interest to officers of the naval service.
The thoughts and opinions. expressed in this publication are
-those , of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy
Department or of the Naval War College.
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..PRESENT AND FUTURI; NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
An · Address delivered by
Bernard M. Baruch
at the Naval · War College
March 31, 1950
Admiral Beary has asked me to talk to you on the subject

of strategy. I certainly ani not equipped

to

discuss strategy as it

relates to specific weapons or to the role of the different services
or even to the. military importance of the atomic bomb.

Since

World War One, however, I have studied the inter-relationships of
war and peace and some of my thoughts in this regard may

terest you.

in

A . little more than a year ago, one member of the Senate

Arm�d Services Committe� came to me in great agitation. He had

heard that a defense budget of $30 billions was being prepared
and he was frightened at what it would do to our economy.

He

asked my advice as to what policy should be followed in the matter

of defense expenditures fo� the cold war;

My reply was that we had to avoid panicky over-spending.

- Instead we had to learn

to pace ourselves in relation to the Russians

and the threat of war. We dared not over-spend on armaments to

where .our social, political and ·economic system might be wrecked

-that would suit the enemy as much as to defeat us militarily. Yet

we dared not maintain so feeble a defense establishment as to in
vite aggression, as it did in Hitler's time.

With each 8'ear· of added cold war attrition, this concept of

"pacing ourselves" · becomes more vital:--and also more difficult
to carry out.

The longer the cold_ war drags, the more essential it

Mr. Baruch, el<ler statesman, financier and philanthropist, was Chair
man of the War Industries Board in World War I. During World
War II, he servjld as adviser to President Roosevelt and War
Mobilization Director James H. Byrnes.
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becomes to husband our resources, yet the greater grows the

danger that the cold war may erupt into a hot, shooting war. In

the past few years, while the whole world has been digging itself
out from under the destruction and exhaustion of the last war, no

potential aggressor has had the material means for waging another

war.

But what will happen when the potential aggressor has re

covered his strength and there still is no peace?

Now by "pacing ourselves" I do not mean that we should

undertake to match Soviet armament, plane by plane, tank by tank,
man for man.

On that I am completely in accord with General

Omar Bradley. However, I do feel that we must vigilantly watch

the over-all degree of Soviet mobilization for war and that we

· dare not permit too great a variance with our own mobilization
or we risk war.

By "pacing ourselves" I also mean that we must preserve a

flexible attitude· towards our problems of defense and not freeze
rigidly on too narrow a strategy.

For example, I would not think

it wise to base our defense exclusively on our ability to retaliate

against the enemy's cities and industries.

To prevent aggression,

it is true that we must be able to retaliate instantly and that the

enemy should know we can do it.

Still, I am not sure that the

"next war" -May it never come-will begin with flagrant open at
tack upon this country.

It

seems to me quite likely that the test

may come in the more subtle form of civil war-probably. in Ger
many.

In event of such a civil war, the situation might be such

that it would be unwise to retaliate against the enemy directly and
yet we would not dare stand by impotent.

In short, I believe our defensive strategy must not only an

ticipate the danger of another all-out war, but that of civil war as

well.

2
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As a matter of fact, it might be said this state of civil war

already exists, that that is what the cold war really is, neither peace

nor total war, but a succession of civil conflicts, more or less violent,
wherever the Soviets can foment such strife.

In Western Europe

we have managed to achieve a sufficient degree of stability to pre
vent open civil war.

In Greece, after a bloody and costly struggle,

the civil war appears to have been decided in the favor of the dem
ocracies. In China we have suffered a truly serious defeat.

That defeat has stirred a good deal of public discussion of

whether we are losing the cold war.

Certainly there is sufficient

reason to feel that what has been done so far is inadequate.

A few weeks ago, the Secretary of State called for "total

diplomacy".

Undoubtedly that is what is needed.

that is not what we have.

Undoubtedly

Although the cold war is now dragging into its sixth year

and despite the enormous resources we have expended, we still

have not faced up

to

what the total peace-waging requires.

We

still stagger from crisis to crisis, with the initiative left to the

enemy.

We still treat each country as a separate problem, in

stead of as part of a unified global strategy.

For several years, now, I have been pressing, both publicly

and privately, for this over-all global strategy, which would do for

the peacemaking what our global strategy did during the recent
war.

To devise this global strategy I have urged that a central

"think body" be created, to survey the whole of the cold war, re

examining our policy and advising the President.

Recently my good friend Senator Vandenberg proposed a

somewhat similar group.

I arri afraid, though, that the re-evalua

tion of American policy he proposes would not go far enough

his letter talks only of political and economic policy.
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not believe that a special committee, which would study the prob

lems of ECA, report and then disband, is enough.

What is needed

is a non-partisan gr<Yu.p which will stay on the job until the cold

war is won, a group which would sit in continuous deliberation on
the whole of the peace-waging, serving as a central point of de

cision, weighing all the many commitments pressed upon us, guid

ing the best disposition of our strained resources, determining

where in the world we are to fight a more holding action and where

we can achieve a decisive break-through-and at what effort.
In short,. what is needed is a General Staff for Peace.

To cite only one instance of the sort of decisions now going

by default-take Indo China.

For tranquility to be restored to that

Asian outpost the civil war now raging there will have to be brought
to a victorious conclusion.

necessary military supplies?

Where are the French to obtain the

It has been suggested that the French

government use the materiel now being allocated to it under the

Military Aid Program.

But the aim of that Military Aid Program

was to strengthen Western Eur-9pe against possible Soviet ag
gression.

Are we then to weaken Western Europe for some half-

hearted and possibly ineffective action in the Orient?

Sooner or later we must expect a showdown over Germany

since Germany cannot be expected to remain divided indefinitely.

Are we pacing ourselves so that we will be ready for that show

down when it comes?

Or will it find us as unprepared as we now

seem to be to deal with conditions in the Far East?

Are we to continue to spread ourselves too thin, unable to

achieve decision anywhere? Hasn't the time come for the expen
diture of sufficient resources to force a decision somewhere?

If our diplomacy is to be truly "total", we must mobilize

not only public opinion but the necessary economic, military and

4
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political resources, applying those resources on the basis of an over
all global strategy. That is not now being done. I doubt that it
will be done unless some central peacemaking agency is created.

I began urging.the formation of such a GHQ for Peace even

before the last war ended.

In memoranda to President Roosevelt

I pointed out that America's greatest power in the peacemaking

would lie in the fact that we would emerge from the war with our·

enormou� productive power untouched by devastation. No country,
in the world would be, able to raise its living standards without
American help.

Our problem would be how to bring this great

productive power to bear upon the peacemaking as decisively as
we had done in the warmaking.

I proposed to President Roosevelt that an Advisory · Peace

Council be created consisting, of the secretaries of State, War,

Navy, Treasury, the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion,
the Foreign Economic · Administrator and Harry Hopkins.

This

body was to consider all peace questions, formulating their recom

mendations for policy, which were to go to the President for his

final decision.

This Council was also to have a small staff of its

own under the direction of a Counsellor who enjoyed the complete
personal confidence of the President.

Roosevelt lik_ed the idea and said he would put it into effect.

He told me he would name James F. Byrnes as its chairman and

Judge Samuel Rosenman, as the Counsellor.

Judge Rosenman was

then in Europe and the President put off establishing the Council
until Rosenman should return.

Shortly after that, President

Roosevelt sent me to London to discuss some matters with Winston

Churchill and while there I told Judge Rosenman about the Presi

dent's plan.

A few days later we received the tragic news that the

President had died.
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When I returned from London, I repeated the suggestion for

this peace council to President Truman and he said he would create
the body. But the idea got shunted off.

"Possibly the reason was the creation of the National Secur

ity Council, which, I was told, was modelled upon the earlier sug

gestion of an Advisory Peace Council to the President. Unfortunate

ly if that is what the Security Council was intended to be, it hasn't

wor}ced out that way. The members of the Security Council are over

worked; its membership needs broadening; its functioning must be

reorganized

to

come to grips with the problems of achieving a de

cision in the peacemaking, instead of avoiding decision as has hap
pened too often in the past.

A revitalized Security Council could do the job but it would

have to be brought under the direction of a man of the stature of
General Marshall, and enlarged with men who have no other busi

ness but this. To win the cold war, there must be one group which
does nothing but think, work, plan-live and breathe-the cold war.

The first task of this revitalized Security Council might well

be to re-examine the whole situation to determine what would be

required to win the cold war and

to plan a step-by-step strategy for

taking the initiative in gaining peace.

Were that done, by the sort

of body I envision, I believe its recommendations would command
the support of the public and Congress.

Without such a central peacemaking agency "total diplo

macy" will remain a mere phrase.

If the American people are told what must be done, honestly

and frankly, they

will see the peace through. On the other hand,
if the tactics adopted are to lure them into ever deeper involvement,

bit by bit, without ever facing up to what the total peacemaking re
quires, then there will always be doubt of their willingness to drift
down a road which has no end.

6
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While this General Staff for Peace is our first need, it is not
our only need. For such a body to function effectively, it must
have the best possible intelligence. How are we to pace ourselves in
relation to the Russians unless we know what they are up to?
It is not easy to figure the Russians out. Still, I am not
prepared to accept the viewpoint of Russia as an unfathomable en
igma behind an impenetrable iron curtain. Certain factors about
the _Soviet Government should make it quite predictable.
As Dictators, the Soviet leaders can act without consulting
their people and are therefore capable of unloosing surprises. But
the Soviet Union is also a planned economy. Everything that hap
pens in Russia is supposed to measure up·to a Five Year Plan, which,
in turn, is broken down into yearly plans. The Plan doesn't always
work out in practice. Still it must reflect the judgments, decisions
-and motives--0f the Soviet leaders.
The Kremlin's calculations as to when war is likely-twenty,
ten, five, two years from now, or even sooner�must be embodied in
Soviet planning, in how critically short materials are divided be
tween immediate military needs and the expansion of Soviet in
dustry, in the rate of purchases abroad of materials the Soviets
lack at home and so on.
Russia. being a dictatorship, none of these things can hap
pen accidentally. Each action must reflect some decision taken in
the Kremlin. Each action reflects some caluculated risk which the
Soviet government is taking. By putting together all of the bits
and pieces, we should have an adequate basis for judging Russia'i:;
intentions as to war or peace.
Studying the Soviet economy in this w:ay should also give us
some means of checking the extravagant reports current as to Rus.,
sia's military strength. One day these reports picture the Soviet
RESTRICTED
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Union building a gigantic air force; then it is a terrific fleet of sub
marines; then it is tanks, and ground forces; then it is a navy. But
Russia can hardly be a great land power, a great naval power, a
great air power, a great atomic power, all at the same time. We
know how difficult and expensive it is for this country to maintain
our defense establishment and Russia has infinitely less resources at
her command than we do.
In the course of "pacing ourselves" we are always likely to
lag somewhat behind the Soviets in terms of readied military
· strength. In itself this is not necessarily alarming since our enor
mous potential for war also serves as a deterrent against aggression.
If overt Soviet aggression }}as been prevented these last few years,
it has not been solely because of our possession of the atomic bomb.
The Soviet leaders have also been mindful of the fact that at the
peak of the last war the United States produced nearly as many air
planes, tanks, guns and other war materiel as the rest of the world
combined.
We can be sure that the Soviet leaders have not forgotten
that fact. But we can also be sure that the Soviet leaders have not
forgotten that it todk us nearly two and a half years to convert our
gigantic productive energies from peace to war.
This time gap in our mobilization is our gravest source of
peril. It is the weakness around. which any enemy must base its ·
war plans. No nation in the world will attack a mobilized America.
The only strategy any enemy can have is to attempt to overwhelm
us during that "too little and too late" period while our military
power is still "on order."
That is the reason why I have never ceased urging the
prompt enactment of a stand-by mobilization plan, which would
insure the swiftest possible marshalling of. all our resources in case
8
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of attack. A ready.:.t.o-go mobilization plan should be put into law
now, to go into instant operation upon joint proclamation by Con
gress and the President. To wait until war has begun and bombs
are actually falling before we begin to legislate is to invite disaster.
Nor is anything to be gained by delay. What needs to be
done is as well known today as it ever will be. The question is
not what should be done, but whether we will do what we know must
be done, or wait until disaster is upon us.
Included in this stand-by mobilization law should be:
An impartial selective service law, with a work-or-fight
clause.
A readied civilian defense.
The elimination of profiteering.
The power to shut down less essential production to give
military needs priority.
Rationing of scarce essentials.
Much higher taxes.
A ceiling on all prices, rents, wages and other costs to pre
vent the inflation which could wreck any mobilization.
These laws would not specify the quantities of weapons to
be produced-that must be kept secret and be constantly revised.
Their objective would be to organize the nation so that if war came,
no time would be lost in meeting any military demands. May I also
emphasize that the whole program is needed, not merely parts of it.
.Under political temptation, some may seek to leave prices uncon
trolled, or . to soften other mobilization measures here and there.
That was done in the last war, at what a terrible cost not alone in
inflation but in lengthening the war and with it the slaughtering
and the maiming !
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To sum up there seem to me to be four major essentials

of. a successful cold war strategy:

1. A military establishment which includes not only an im
mediate available striking force of sufficient power to in

sure prompt retaliation and deter aggression, but one
flexible enough to deal with possible civil war abroad.

2. A ready-to-go mobilization plan which will insure the
swiftest mobilization of all our resources-men, money
and materials-in case we or our allies are attacked.

3. An effective intelligence agency to provide the informa
tion needed to pace ourselves in relation to the Soviets
and the threat of war.
4. A general staff for peace, to re-evaluate the whole of the
peacewaging and to formulate a global strategy which
will achieve a decision for peace.
One final thought, which I always like to leave with a group
such as yours. In the past, the American people tended to deny
the realities of power and to think that peace could be preserved
by mere moral pronouncements, by "outlawing" war and so on.
Today, there is general realization that peace is impossible unless

supported by military strength. Still, although aware of this fact,
many Americans are uneasy about it. They would like to forget
their dependence on military power, and so there is much grumbling
about the so-called "militarization of American life" and of the
"military running the country".

Don't let this grumbling disturb you. Yours is the right
to be proud of your profession. You have brought imperishable

glory to America. More important, you have never failed this
country in your role as the guardian and protector of our liberties.

10
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What makes" a police state is not the existence of the police

but the absence of law behind the police.

What makes a military

state is not the existence of the military but that the military con

stitute themselves the state. The American soldier-and by that

I mean you naval men as well as the members of the other serv

ice�has never attempted to be a law unto himself. I resent any

attempt to force you into a second-class citizenship. I, . for one,

want, to acknowledge the great debt we all owe you.

I will close with a quotation from "England's Answer'' by

Rudyard Kipling.

"Go to your work and be strong, halting not in your ways,

, Baulking the end half-won for an instant dole of praise.

Stand to your work and be wise--certain of sword and pet!,

Who are neither children nor Gods, but men in a world of men !"
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CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS
A lecture delivered by

Rear Admiral George L. Russell, U. S. N.
at the Naval War College
on April 11, 1950

It is a distinct pleasure for me to have the opportunity of
addressing members of the Naval War College this morning. Some
months ago I received the invitation from Admiral Beary, who
suggested that an appropriate topic would be "Recent Decisions
in International Law". In the time which is allotted to me I will
do well to do more than hit some of the high spots.
I am aware of the fact that the Naval War College con
ducts a correspondence. course in International Law. I plead
guilty to not having taken it myself, but it is my belief that those
who have been fortunate enough to have had the course will be
more likely to get the right answers should they find themselves
in a position where. it will fall to them to apply the principles of In
ternational Law to a given situation. To the extent that the corres
pondence courses and that portion of the curriculum at the College
may be supplemented by up-to-date decisions, I propose to discuss a
few of the cases that have come to me for opinion during the last
couple of years. In addition, I shall take the liberty of expanding
the subject matter to cover not only recent decisions but also re
cent international activities which have a bearing on it.
International Law is probably most unsatisfactory to those
of us who have a leaning towards such exact subjects as mathe
matics. For that matter, all law is an inexact subject. Interna
tional Law is particularly baffling to those who must rely on a
written set of rules and regulations. The fact remains that the
Rear Admiral Russell is Judge Advocate General of the Navy, a
position he has held since 1948. From 1945-1948, he was Assistant
Judge Advocate General.
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field is· very broad indeed and that some phases of it have been
reduced to such rules and regulations. The frustrating part of
that is that it seems at times that there are no teeth in those
. rules, no way to enforce them, and that therefore they a,re of
little or no effect. This is not entirely true. We have, of course,
seen numerous examples of nations wh�ch paid no attention to the
solemn obligations of a treaty, and as of today, Soviet Russia and
her satellites appear to ignore, among other things, the provisions
of that branch of international law regarding_prisoners of war.
Notwithstanding the difficulties of establishing and admin
istering a body of rules for international conduct, some 49 nations
were represented at a conference at Stockholm, Sweden, to formu
late new rules regarding the treatment of Prisoners of War and
civilians during time of war. Soviet Russia was invited to the
Stockholm conference but declined. to participate. When a sub
sequent conference was held at Geneva last summer, however,
Russia appeared and made the fiftieth nation to take part in the
proceedings, thereby indicating that Russia is not so insensitive
to world ·opinion as we have every right to deduce from the · ac
tivities of the Kremlin. The Geneva Conference resulted in the
adoption of four treaties based on the drafts drawn up at Stock
holm. These treaties were:
1. For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick of Armed Forces in the Field.
2. Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship
wrecked Members of armed forces at Sea.
3. Treatment of Prisoners of War.
4. Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
The United States signed all four treaties. However, these
treaties have not yet received the advice and consent of the
Senate.

14
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As you know, a milestone of international law was passed

in 1949 upon the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty.

basic purpose of the treaty is to maintain peace and security.

The

It

is a collective measure within the framework of the U. N. Charter
to safeguard the inherent right of self-defense in the event of an
armed attack upon any of the signatories of the treaty.
nations signed the treaty,

Twelve

The new obligations undertaken by

the United States in the treaty are:

1. To maintain and develop, separately and jointly and by
means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,

the individual and collective capacity of the parties to re
sist armed attack (Art. 3)

2. To consult whenever in the opinion of any of the parties,

the territorial integrity, political independence, or security

of any of them is threatened. (Art. 4)

3. To consider an armed attack upon any of the parties in the

North Atlantic Area
and

an attack against them all (Art. 5),

4. In the event of such an attack, to take forthwith, individ
ually and in concert with the other parties, such action as

the United States deems necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic Area (Art. 5).

The treaty expressly provides that all of its provisions must be

carried out in accordance with the respective constitutional pro

cesses of the parties, which means that our Congress still retains

its power

to

declare war.

However, the plenary power of the

President to make use of armed forces is likewise retained.

The

provision of the United Nations Charter, wherever applicable, con

trol every activity undertaken under the treaty.

RESTRICTED
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Of more direct interest to you in this connection is the des

cription of the North Atlantic Area.

The word "area" is intended

to cover the general region, rather than merely the North Atlantic

Ocean in a narrow sense, and includes the western part of the

Mediterranean as well as the North Sea and most of the Gulf of

Mexico.

The term North Atlantic Area is general in description,

and this choice of words appears to have been deliberate. From our

standpoint such general language appears preferable.

I say this

because it would seem inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty to

provide that Article 5 would come into operation in the event of an

attack, for example, upon ships or aircraft at a given point but
not if the attack occurred a few miles away.

If there should be

any doubt as to whether or not an armed attack has taken place

within the area specified in the treaty, each party would decide for

itself, in the light of the facts surrounding the particular situation
and the significance of the attack.

Time does not permit further discussion of this important

treaty of which· I have discussed but a few of the high points. As

I indicated before, Article 3 of the Treaty embodies the principle of

"continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid," which is the

principle that forms the· basis of the European recovery program.

It

was felt by the Congress that the implementation of this prin

ciple would not only help to deter aggression, but would go far, in

the event all the efforts of the parties for peace should fail, to as

sure the successful defense of the United States· and the collective

strength essential for victory. And indeed shortly after the coming
into force of the North Atlantic Treaty, Congress passed the Mu

tual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.

Briefly, this Act author

izes the President to furnish military assistance to nations who are

parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and who have requested such
assistance.

The Act further requires that the assistance must be.

furnished in furtherance of the common defense of the North At-

16
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lantic area and to further the development of unified defense plans
in order to realize unified direction and effort.
In addition, military assistance is authorized to be furnfahed ·
to Iran, Korea, and the Philippines. . The law further permits as- ·
sistance to be furnished without payment except as may be provided

in agreements concluded .with nations to whom assistance is furn
ished. Assistance may take the form of procurement from any
source and transfe� of any equipment,· materials, or services.

No

materials however, may be transferred out of military stocks, if the

Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of·

Staff, determines that such transfer
would
.
' be detrimental to the national security.

The President is directed to enter into agreements

with nations :receiving aid.

Such agreements must contain pro-·

visions (a) that the use of the .assistance
the purposes

of

will

be in furtherance of

the Act; (b) that the. recipient nation will not

transfer the equipment or materials, information, or services re
r

ceived without the President's consent; (c) for the secuity of any

article, service or information furnished; and (d) that the reciP
ient nation will furnish reciprocal aid to the United States or other

nations consistent with the United Nations Charter to further the

purposes of the Act.

The President· must terminate assistance when (a) the re

cipient nation requests it be terminated, (b) if the President de

termines it would be inconsistent. with the United States national
interest or security Qf the United States or the purposes of the

Act, or (e) if' the President finds that the continuation of assist-

. ance would be inconsistent with any United States obligation un•.
der the United Nations Charter, or if the General Assembly of the

United Nations finds continuance undesirable, or ·it may be termi
nated by ·Congress.

Among other things, the Act allows personnel of the armed
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Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950

17
19

Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 5, Art. 1

services to be detailed to non.,combatarit duty abroad, or to any
agency, for the purposes of the Act. In carrying out the purposes
of the Act, the Secretary of Defense has designated a Director
of the . Office of Military Assistance in· his own office and· has desig
nated a U. S. Military Representative for Military Assistance in
Europe. The Secretary of Defense has established two basic guid
ing principles in this program. First, that Military Assistance ac
tivities will be accounted for separately from other activities of
the Deprtment of Defense, and second, except for the specific re
lationships esta.blished for overseas operations, by the agreements
between the Department of Defense and the Department of State,
all dealings with other Departments in this program will be to and
through the office of the Secretary of Defense.
I can say that as of today the program is developing rap
idly and many officers from the three services have been detailed
to Europe to assist the program.
Of the many problems of international character handled
by my office, the problems of jurisdiction are the most frequent.
Due to the sending of thousands of our forces to foreign countries, ·
the problem of jurisdiction is· bound to be a recurring one. I will
discuss th� problem of civil jurisdiction as distinguished from crim
inal jurisdiction first. As you know, we naturally prefer to maintain
exclusive jurisdiction over our forces · abroad, but exclusive juris
diction in civil proceedings is a right that is very hard for us to claim
on the basis of international precedent. Criminal jurisdiction has a
logical basis in the assertion that if it is exercised by the sovereign
of the territories visited, it might interfere with the personal free
dom of the visiting sovereign's forces. This is not inherent in
civil jurisdiction and therefore, although we claim it, we are on
much poorer ground. The fundamental basis why foreign countries
have been loathe to yield their nationals' rights to bring suit in
18
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civil proceedings against our people has been that where damage is
done with intent or by negligence, the people who have had dam

age done to their property should have some recourse.

We recognized this finally by our Foreign Claims Act of 2
January 1942, as amended (31 U.. S. C. 224d), with which all of you

should be familiar, because it may give you a way out in some such
case.

Under this Act where the loss of or damage or destruction

to public or private property is caused by or incident to non-com

bat activities of military and naval personnel, it may be adjudicated.

The Congress contemplated the settlement of two types of

claims under the provision of the Foreign Claims Act, namely, (1)

claims based on acts or omissions involving a lack of reasonable

care on the part of United States military personnel involved; and

(2) claims arising out of authorized activities of United States

forces which are peculiarly military activities having little parallel

in civilian pursuits.

The Foreign Claims Act affords a ready means of promptly

settling claims of inhabitants of ioz:eign countries, grounded on
damage to their persons or property which is caused by Army, Navy,
or Marine Corps forces.

It

is a statute which can be of great ·as

Flis_tance to commanding officers of occupation or visiting units in
friendly foreign countries.

The speedy, on the spot, settlement of

such claims, if within the punriew of the Foreign Claims Act,
will do much to improve relatio,:,s during and after the occupation
or visit.·.

An example of what may happen when the Foreign Claims

Act is not invoked is a case which arose in Lisbon where a couple of
our sailors from a destroyer during a "good will" visit of an

American naval squadron took a private automobile without the
consent of the owner.

While operating the car on a "joyride" they
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collided with another privately owned automobile. They were ar
rested and later turned over to their commanding officer on the
promise that the resulting damages would be made good..· The com
manding officer effected a settlement of the claims with the assist
ance of the Naval Attache by paying the claims out of the ship's
welfare and recreation fund. When the claim for reimbursement of
the ship's fund finally drifted into the Navy Department for pa_y
ment under the Foreign Claims Act, we had to inform the Naval
Attache that he, as well as any commanding officer had authority to
convene a foreign claims commission and that it was his duty to
do so in order that meritorious claims might be promptly settled
and fri�ndly relations engendered thereby. In order to give wide
dissemination to the existence and purpose of the Act, this case
was reported in the Advance Copy of Court Martial Order No. 18
of 25 August 1948.
We have paid a variety of foreign claims under the authority
granted by this Act. A brief summary of some of t�e claims paid
will help you to visualize the wide range of the provisions of the
Act. For instance, the claim for destruction by fire of a Chinese
godown while occupied by units of the Marine Corps was paid even
though the cause of the fire was undetermined. Injuries received
as the result of unprovoked assaults and as a result of negligent
operation of motor vehicles form the basis for payment in a large
number of cases. The visits of our task forces to Australia seem
to generate what we call "the Case of the Missing Cameras." The
camera is checked by an Australian visitor as he boards one of our
· men-of-war and cannot be located when he is ready to depart, Such
cases could be processed at once by a commission convened by the
commanding officer.
The Foreign Claims Act is available not only to the Army,
but also through the Unification Act to the Air Force. The Army
20
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and the Air Force, however, administer the Act through standing
foreign claims commissions appointed by the Army and Air Force
commanders in the field.

Since the Navy moves around frequently,

this procedure cannot be followed, but a foreign claims commission
must be appointed by a commanding officer in the area where the

injury occurs or in the locality where the claim is presented, de

pending upon the expediencies of the situations. Since unification,

the three services are attempting, with marked success, a coordina
tion of policy in the handling .and treatment .of this class of claims.

The point I wish to stress is that since Congress has pro

vided a simple and efficient machinery for the prompt settlement

of claims of this type, every effort should be made by the service

concerned to employ the Foreign Claims Act whenever applicable

in order to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of friend
ly relations in foreign countries '.

The prompt and proper employ

ment of the Act will increase the prestige of the nation; the branch

of the service and particular unit involved.

Turning now to the matter of criminal jurisdiction over our

forces abroad, I can say that it is a very legal and technical prob

lem.

Nevertheless I discuss it with you here because it is a

question which will arise in the career of almost every officer and
particularly,

in command or staff

functions.

You

will

have

questions of legal jurisdiction to decide, and some background for

them is necessary.

These jurisdictional questions are a natural re

sult of two principles of· international law that very clearly con
flict.

The first principle is the theory of sovereignty which gives

to a state exclusive jurisdiction over all persons within its boundary.

The second principle is the rule that a state has exclusive juris

diction over its armed forces.

During the course of World War II

we had stationed large contingents of our armed forces in foreign

countries and it should be quite clear to all of you what a clash

automatically occurs between these two principles in any such
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The theories have been attempted to be reconciled

by the general rule of international law that a sovereign, in permit

ting armed forces of another sovereign to come into its territory,

thereby automatically waived jurisdiction and granted jurisdiction

to the visiting sovereign over its own forces.

This view was set forth for the purpose of international

law and for the purpose of American law in the well known case of

Schooner Exchange v. McFadderi i

That case is a landmark of the

law and is a fine example of Chief Justice Marshall's leadership in
that particular field.

Although the Schooner Exchange case in

volved a French warship which was libeled in the port of Philadel

phia, the basis for the various questions of jurisdiction and the

American view on the subject came from a remark he made in the

course of his opinion to the effect that "a case in which the sov-:

ereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction
is where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through hi.:'1
domain."

That case became the precedent for a good many other

cases, which I could cite to you for several minutes at least.
The British wouldn't go along with that view.

It

is inter

esting to note that one of the reasons undoubtedly has been that in

most cases we haven't had visiting forces. We have had our forces

visiting and for that reason we have always insisted that juris

diction should lie with us.

Whereas, in the case of the British,

they are much mQre likely visited and therefore they have at

tempted to cut down some of the jurisdiction of the visiting sov

ereign who in the past war particularly, has been the United

States.

The British, before the last war, held that jurisdiction only

extended in the quarters that were assigned to the visiting forces,

for example, where we had a base. Within that base we could exer

cise exclusjve jurisdiction over our people.

22
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they· got into trouble, they were subject to the British civil and

criminal law.

Fina.Uy, in order to minimize difficulties between

Great Britain and the United States during the past war, Great

Britain agreed without prejudice

to

yield to the American view.

They did that by a statute known as the United States of Amer

ica Visiting Forces Act, passed by Parliament oh 27 July 1942,

which denied all jurisdiction to British Courts to try members of

the United States armed forces.

This question is still a live issue

and some of you may very rapidly come in contact with it.

A

memorandum of the Secretary of State of the United States, dated

February 5th, 1946, in reply.to an Aide Memoire (which is a diplo

matic letter) from the British Embassy, points out the clear con

flict between the British and the American theories of jurisdic

tion and amends the American view (and this, I might add, is

something which is important as stating our present position), in
that, "Pending further experience, this government did not ob

ject to the exercise by British courts of jurisdiction of civil pro

ceedings involving members of the armed forces of the United

States provided no attempt was made to exercise any control over

their persons and provided further that judgment was not rendered

against them when they were prevented by official duties from de
fending the action".

About two years ago the British government

raised the question of repealing the Visiting Forces Act on the

grounds that there were not enough United States armed forces

personnel in England to warrant retention of the Act.

Due, how

ever, to the recent increase in military personnel, particularly Air

Force personnel, in England, the Secretary of Defense strongly

urged the retention of the Act, and no doubt in these critical days,

no further attempt will be made to repeal it.

The question of jurisdiction is sharply pointed up in the Brit

ish colonies where leased bases are located.

As you know, we ob

tained 99 y,ear leases to establish bases in certain British colonies
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in return for the transfer of 50 destroyers to the British several
months prior to our ,entry into World War II. All questions of
jurisdiction were supposed to be settled by Article IV of the Leased
Bases Agreement which, provid.es for American jurisdiction in the
first instance over military offenses committed by members of our
forces either within or without the leased areas. It provides for
American jurisdiction in the. first instance of offenses committed
by British nationals where the offense is committed and the of
fender apprehended within the .leased area, and American jurisdic
tion in the first instance in the case of nationals of other countries
where the offense is committed in the leased area regardless of
. where the offender is apprehended.
Three points should be noted with regard to cases pertaining
to jurisdictional questions as a matter of practical policy for the
officer in the field: (1) The first one is the Military Establishment's
policy of adherence to the American doctrine of extraterritoriality
for our forces unless modified by agreement with the nation con
cerned, and, only in such case in strict adherence to the terms of
the modifying agreement. (2) The second point is that where proper
authority exists, the implementation of existing international in
struments by working arrangements with local authorities, may be
approved as long as you don't fly in the,,face of international rules
and policies of the Military Establishment. It makes for smooth
working out of local affairs. (3) The third point is the necessity
that, in a case of any implementation, the Departm�nt concerned·
. be kept fully advised in the matter, particularly if the questions
are, as they are apt to be, eventually referred to them.
Now with regard to jurisdiction in other countries. Our
military jurisdiction within base areas, our own bases or our own
ships, has been universally conceded as long as we are ln the area
or on the ships. The main problem ·always involves jurisdiction
over non-military criminal offenses committed outside of our bases
24
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This is especially true where there is damage don.e to

nationals of a foreign country, either physical injury or property

damage. Negotiations to meet these various problems are constantly being conducted.

Following the Confederation of Newfoundland and Canada on

March 31, 1949, the Canadian Government requested changes in

. the Leased Base Agreement with Newfoundland with respect to its

taxation, customs exemptions, postal services, and jurisdiction pro
visions. Negotiations are still proceeding on the requested revisions.

Of primary interest are the negotiations pertaining to the juris

diction provision ofthe Leased Base Agreement with Newfoundland.

In the view of the· Canadian Government this provision was unde
sirable because it gave to U. S. courts jurisdiction over Ganadian

citizens and did not adequately protect the position of Canadian

civil courts.

give

Our position has been that while the provision does

u: S. service courts some jurisdiction over British or Canadian

nationals, it requires that the trial of such persons must be before

a United States

civil court sitting in the leased area.·

Since we have

never maintained such courts within any of the leased areas and·

since there is no present intention of maintaining such courts, the

result is that no Canadian nationals have been tried, nor is there
any likelihood that any would be..

Another point of difl'erence is that the Agreement was

thought to deal with civil as well as with criminal jurisdiction and

the Canadian Government had the impression that our service per

sonnel had immunity from the civil jurisdiction of the Territory.

Our position is that the provision deals exclusively , with criminal

jurisdiction. The Canadian Government. also requested revision of
the jurisdiction provision of the Agreement because it conferred

exclusive jurisdiction upon U. S. authorities in some respects. Our
position is that from the words "The United States shall have the

absolute right in the first instance" to take jurisdiction does not
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preclude the local courts from exercising jurisdiction subsequently

in certain specified types of offenses. All of which is to say that our
Government takes the position that all jurisdiction is concurre�t,

although in certain indicated cases the United States has the right

to exe:r:cise jurisdiction in the first instance. We can all watch with ·)
interest the final result of these negotiations.

We now have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over naval and

military personnel in Brazil, and in Uruguay, rec�gnized by the

Supreme Courts of the particular countries involved.. In Egypt and

with the China Nationalist regime, we have similar exclusive juris:- ·
diction by agreements which have been reached through diplomatic
channels. With some countries, we have agreements like · the one
with Denmark for the defense of Greenland by which we exercise

exclusive jurisdiction over any acts by personnel, that are concerned
directly with. the defense of the bases there.

The problem is somewhat different in the Philippines. The

Philippine Islands were given their independence on July 4, 1946,

and the RepubHc of the Philippines is now, as you know, an inde

pendent nation.

The Philippines present. no exception to the adol

escent experience of all states in that, when first embarking- upon

an independent career, they experienced severe ·growing pains and
their national passions ran high.

Shortly after the Philippines

achieved their independence, a military bases agreement was · ne
gotiated .with the Philippine Government.

The . Military Bases

Agreement of March 14, 1947 grants to the United States the right

to retain the use of certain bases listed in the agreement for a period

of 99 years. Some of these bases, such as the naval reservations at
Su.hie Bay and Sangley Point, were reserved to the United States by

an executive order of the President issued sometime before World

.War II, and the Navy Department has consistently maintained that

title thereto was never relinquished to the Philippine Government by
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While some of the

provisions of the Philippine Military Bases Agreement of March 14,

1947 are somewhat similar to those of the United Kingdom Leased

Bases Agreement of March 27, 1941, the jurisdiction articles thereof

differ in many respects.

Under Article XIII of the Military Bases

Agreement, the Philippine Government yielded to the United States

jurisdiction over three classes of offenses: (a) those committed by

any person within the base, except where the offender and offended

parties are both Philippine citizens not members of the United
States Armed Forces on active duty, or the offense is against the

security of the Philippines and the offender is a Philippine citizen;

(b) those committed outside the bases by a member of the United

States Armed Forces and the offended party is also a member of

the armed forces; and, (c) those committed outside the bases by a

membe.r of the United States Armed Forces against the security
of the United States.

The Philippine Government, however, re

served jurisdiction over all other offenses committed outside of the
bases by any member of the United States Armed Forces.

Another problem which is active in the field of international

law has to do with maritime jurisdiction and territorial waters. As

you know, the United States has always asserted the "freedom of
the

limit

seas"
as

proposition,

the

maximum

and

has

extent

adhered

of

to

territorial

the

three-mile

waters.

How

ever, other nations have in recent months sought to extend the limits
of their territorial waters.

For instance, Yugoslavia claims a six

mile limit, Costa Rica extended its protection and control over a zone
extending 200 nautical miles from the continental coasts including

off-shore islands, and the Russians have asserted a 12 mile limit.

During the war the United States by Executive Order created de

fensive · sea areas, which extended more than three miles from

shore, but these were never challenged, since · it was considered
legal to create such areas for our national security.
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been very careful to reiterate the general rule of international law

that the defensive sea areas in no way had the effect of extending

sovereignty over our territorial waters beyond the three mile ·
limit.

Two or three years ago

a

diplomatic incident occurred be

tween the United States and Russia involving international law

and the Navy Department, which serves to illustrate one of the
many problems of territorifl waters.

The Russians complained

that their territorial waters had been violated by Navy planes in
the Alaskan sector.

You may recall from your history that when

. Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867, a dividing line was
drawn on the chart in the seas between Russia and Alaska. · It

was the intent of the treatymakers that all

land to the eastward

of this line should belong to the United States, and to the west
ward to Russia.

An official protest was received from the Soviet

government that a Navy plane had circled the Soviet ship TEMP
in a position which they claimed plotted to the westward of this
line and was therefore a violation of their territorial waters.

The

position, when plotted from information received from our aviators,
turned out to be slightly to the eastward of the line and the !De

partment of State submitted to the Navy Department a proposed

reply to the Soviet government which stated that fact without

more. The Navy Department took the position, however, that
our retort should not be based on this premise, but rather on the

fact that even the position given by the Soviet government was

well outside the limit of territorial waters of the Soviet Union

as recognized by established rules of international law. .Accord

ingly, the official reply pointed out that since the position of the
Soviet ship was 35 miles to the northeast of Cape Wellen it was

upon the high seas and thus not subject to restriction.

It was

our fear that the Soviet government might construe the first dis

patch to mean that we acknowledged that they had sovereignty

28
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over all waters to the westward of this imaginary line of demar
cation. The fact that the Soviet government had, in 1926, issued
a decree that they intended to exercise sovereignty over all land
areas in ,a sector to tlie northward of the Soviet Union and extenq
ing to the north pole influenced. our decision. This Government
has never recognized the sector theory of sovereignty of polar areas
either in the Arctic or the Antarctic.
The latest territ<;>rial waters problem has· given us consider
able trouble in the Far East� On June 25, 1949, the Chinese Na
tionalist Government proclaimed a !'port closure" of certain Chinese
ports inc.luding. Shanghai. The United States and Great Britain
. refused to recognize the port closure on the grounds that it was il
legal since the Nationalists were trying to close ports over which
they had no effective control. However, the presence of Nationalist·
war vessels in the Yangtze Estuary demonstrated that it was able
to effectively control the egress and ingress of vessels operating
in the Communist held port of Shanghai. Apparently our own
State Department people reasoned that to recognize the port
closure would be tantemount to recognizing a "blockade", although
there is a distinct difference. In any event, if our nation had rec
ognized it as a blockade, it would have meant recognition of a
belligerent status, with the attending rights of belligerency on
both the Red Government and the Nationalist Government---so:me
thing that our country is not yet ready to accord. Following our
Government's protest to the Nationalist Government, the Depart
ment of State issued a notice to American shipping lines that to en
ter Shanghai or certain other Chinese ports would be at their own
risk. All American shipping lines, except one, refrained from en
tering Shanghai. The one line who refused to accede to the admQn•
ition of the State Department was the Isbrandtsen Company. That
.particular company, as you read in the papers, continued to send ita
RESTRICTED
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ships up the Yangtze·Estuary. Eventually, some of these ships.were

intercepted and fired upon. Meanwhilf the Isbrandtsen Company

flooded the State Department and Navy Department with telegrams
and, letters demanding naval protection to their. vessels.

'!,'hey

argued that since the Government refused to recognize . the port

closure, they were within their rights in taking their ships into
Shanghai. Moreover, they insisted that i.n accordance with Navy

Regulations, the Navy had the·· mandatory duty of furnishing

protection to their vessels. The Navy regulations_ specifically in

voked are the following:

Article 0620, which reads as follows:
.

"So far as lies within his power, acting in conform.ity with

international law and treaty obligations, the senior officer

present shall protect all commercial vessels and aircraft of

the United States in their lawful occupation, and shall ad

vance the commercial interests of this eountey."
Article 0614 provides that:

"l. The use of force by United States naval personnel

against a friendly foreign state, or against anyone within

the territories thereof, is illegal.

2. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which

belongs to states as well as to individuals, and in the case of

· states it includes the protection of the state, its honor, and
its possessions, and · the lives and property of its citizens

against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby

the state or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury.

The conditions calling for the application of the right of
self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must

be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who

are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible
care and forebearance.

In no case shall force be exercised

in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the
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right of self-preservation as above defined.
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It must be

used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which

is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It

can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment
for acts already committed.

3. Whenever, in the application of the above-mentioned

principles, it shall become necessary to land an armed force

in a foreign territory on occasions of political disturbance

where the local authorities are unable to give adequate pro
tection to life and property, the assent of such ·authorities,

or of some one of them, shall first be obtained, if it can be
done without prejudice to the interests involved."

The Isbrandtsen Company, not satisfied with the replies ob

tained from the Secretary of the Navy, carried its campaign to the

press, and bought several full-page ads in the New York Times and

Washington Post insisting that a mandatory duty lay upon the
Navy to protect its vessels in that situation. This was followed by

a letter to the President accusing Admiral Berkey and the 7th Fleet

of lapping up all the whiskey in Manila instead of performing their
duties to the Isbrandtsen ships, and demanded the punishment of

the Secretary of the Navy and the officers responsible by General

Court Martial.

Finally, it appeared that some of the attacks on the

Isbrandtsen ships took place on the high seas, and Admiral Berkey

then set up a patrol and drew an arbitrary line westward of which

our vessels would not offer protection. This line was well outside of

Chinese territorial waters, anµ was not mearit to be definitive of

Chinese territorial waters, but simply for patrol purposes.

Since

the establishment of the patrol there have been no further incidents,

probably because lsbrandtsen has elected to unload its cargoes at

Tsingtao and Taku · Bar rather than at Shanghai.

The Navy position, while never publicly expressed, has simply
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been that the duty to protect the lawful commerce of the United
States is a discretionary and not a mandatory duty as insisted up
on by the Isbrandtsen Company. This position is clear from the
language of the Regulations wherein the words "the conditions call
ing for the application of the right of self-preservation ... must
be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers ..." I could
go at length into the merits and demerits of the Isbrandtsen posi
tion, our own position and that of the Chinese Nationalist Govern
ment. However, time does not permit.But I do want to get over to
you the point of discretionary duty as distinguished from man,.
datory duty, which is a practical distinction which everyone of you.
should understand.
Another current problem pertaining to maritime jurisdic
tion is that of the submarines of a certain foreign power which per
sist in hovering off our coasts. In dealing with the problem it has
been necessary to invoke certain principles of international law.
Hovering foreign submarines are generally considered to be possi
ble threats to our national security. We do not question the right
of innocent passage of foreign submarines through our territorial
waters. It is our position, however, that if a foreign submarine
comes within our territorial sea, · she must navigate on the surface
and. comply with our domestic regulations of navigation. Our re
quirement in this respect is supported by international'law. Among
other places, the expression of. the principle may. be found in the
final Act of the Hague Codification Conference of 1930.. It appears
that where a foreign submarine hovers off our coasts, submerged or
surfaced, international law recognizes this as a possible hostile
threat to our security. Furthermore, international law recognizes
the inherent right of self-defense of a nation whose security is
threatened, which means that under the great doctrine of "reason
ableness" a nation may take reasonable measures to protect its
security and right of privacy. A noted authority has stated:
32
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"Justification of such defensive measures of prevention ...

rests generally upon the casual connection between acts

sought to be thwarted and injury otherwise to be antici

pated from them by the aggrieved State within its terri

tory. As that connection may be found to exist at varying

distances from the outer limits of territorial waters, the
freedom of such a State is not on principle dependent upon

the precise location of the spot where an offender may be

apprehended, or upon the possession of the State of a

special right of control over that spot." (Hyde, Int'l. Law,

Vol. I, P. 460)

This is to say that whether the submarine is within or without our
territorial waters and there is reasonable belief that its actions con

stitute a threat to our security, we can take reasonable measures,

including force, to repel that threat.

It is with_ hope and uncertainty that we are able to view the

influence which international law may have on the conduct of war in

the future. It was hoped through the war crimes trials that future
wars of aggression would cease; it was hoped that prisoners of war

in the wars of the future would receive more humane treatment by

their captors. Today, we have Russia who has yet to repatriate all

of the many prisoners of war she captured during World War II.

It is known that many of the prisoners she still holds are suffering
privations and are being used in slave labor battalions.

We have

seen in the past few years how Russia has taken over one nation
after another.

This has been most discouraging, particularly since

the Russians have participated in the war crimes program them

selves, and have condemned those acts which they continue to

commit themselves. However, there is a bright ray of hope-as
yet there is no shooting war, and the Russians are sensitive to
world opinion. For that re�son you find them using the United

Nations as ,..a forum to justify their position and acts before the
,.
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world. As mentioned before, the Russians refused to-participate
However,
··in the Stockholm Prisoner of War Conference.
they

the
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1949. when
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on

effect

Con-.
the
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ners of all nations will most certainly take account of these facts'.

The one great fear I have is the /world wide efforts of Russia to
install communist regimes in all countries.

It is forseeable that

with continued success they might in time control a majority of
the votes in the United Nations and thus try to cloak their infamy
with the aegis of legal authority.

However remote, it is still a

possibility unless we keep militarily strong, and assist the peace"

loving democracies back to economic stability.

Our lease base agreements with the United Kingdom still

have 90 years to run before they expire.

In the event of a future

war these. bases will become bastions of defense for this country.

The international law that governs their use is found in treaty, the
so-called lease base agreements

In the event of another war, the former Japanese, mandated

islands of the Pacific; which · are now being administered by the

Trusteeship Agreement· with the United Nations, having already

been declared strategic areas, will be used as military and naval
bases, subject to the rules set forth in the Trusteeship Agreement:

It is my own belief that international law has made rapid

progress in its development during the past few years. Certainly,
.

I

as of today this nation and the world stands in a far better position,

insofar as international law is concerned, in the event of future war
than it did in 1939.

We now have on the public record certain

standards of treatment of prisoners of war and civilians universally
approved from the humanitarian standpoint.
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Nations which is struggling to perpetuate peace, but which in the

eveµt of war, can exercise a strong moral force that will go far to

restrain irresponsible conduct in the waging of a war. Lastly, we

have the International Court of Justice, which if properly imple

mented, may one day be able to enfore� standards of conduct which
humanity insists must be maintained in the conduct of war.
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ECONOMIC ELEMENTS OF U. S. WAR POTENTIAL
A lecture delivered by

Dr.

Bertrand Fox

at the Naval War College
October 6, 1949

My topic this morning is "Economic Elements of the U. S.
War Potential." As you can·imagine, it is a tremendous topic and
I am going to have to skim fairly lightly and rapidly over many
phases of it. I will talk in fairly general terms and hope that vari
ous specific details can be brought out later in the question period.
I want to deal with the topic in three major headings and, if there
is time, to add one additional topic.
My first of the three headings is "The determinants of maxi
mum overall production potential." The first point I want to
make is to dispose of money. In peacetime, the magnitude of what
is produced in the aggregate, and for any particular segment of the
ecomomy the maximum of a given thing that can be produced, de
pends upon money demand. Therefore, we think of money as be
ing of tremendous importance to the volume of production. In war
time, however, if the country is solidly behind you, there is no
problem of appropriations such as you have in peacetime. There
is no problem that is really difficult relative to raising the money
to buy what has to be produced. The government will provide the
demand with money that can come either through taxes, borrow
ing, or if necessary, various other inflationary means.
Money itself is not a limiting factor in war production
that is something that can be disposed of fairly easily. We do use
money, howeve;, as a general measure, and I will keep referring
today to a particular magnitude that we call gross national product,
Doctor Fox is professor of Business Administration at Harvard Uni
versity. He has been a consultant to the Munitions Board and Na
tional Security Resources Board since 1947.
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which is the sum total in value terms of all the goods and services
produced in this country. That is the measure we use of the total
level of pl'()duction. It is measured in terms of money because you
cannot add tanks, ships, and yards of cloth. We have to have a
common denominator, and for this we use money. But as far as I
a.m �oncerned and from the point of view of this presentation, we
can dispose of money.
The real determinants of production come down to the basic
and physical factors of production, and I want to deal with each very
rapidly. First, the human factor-labor. Out of any given popu
lation, the labor force actually is a small fraction-less than half.
Out of our population today of approximately one hundred forty to
one hundred forty-five million people, OU:f labor force. is somewhere
around sixty to sixty-five million people. Now the magnitude of
the labor force depends on the composition of the population. Rus
sia with a much larger population has a smaller labor force. They
are in a stage of a rapidly growing population. We are in a stage.
of greater stability of population1 The greater the stability of
the population, the less rapid is the growth, hence the larger is
the proportion which is in the working age group. So you have to
consider not only the population, but also its age distribution and
its composition. Our labor force today is somewhere around sixty
two to sixty-five million people.
The second element we have to think of is the degree of
employment of that labor force. We hear all kinds of talk of
"full employment". The term "full employment" is· really "high
level employment". If we ever reached a point of full employment,
our whole system would be completely. rigid with no mobility or
flexibility. Full employment really implies: "With a sixty million
labor force-somewhere around one to two million unemployed."
They were the float. That's the group that provides the flexibility
38
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to shift from job to job as the production of certain things is
stepped· up and other things are curtailed.
In war time, at the peak of employment during World War

II, we got down to a figure of a.bout eight hundred thousand un
employed. At that stage our whole system was tight and rigid.

The problem of staffing various munitions lines which were on the
upswing, of transferring workers from the lines where production
was to decline to those where we needed more workers was a ter
ribly difficult job with that degree of unemployment. Ordinarily
we need somewhat more than that to provide the flexibility re
quired in a changing production pattern.
The third element is the amount of time workers are em
ployed. Here, I think, today the average work week, taking days
off and things of that kind, is somewhere around 35 hours a week.

I think the standard forty-hour week now has gone by the boards
somewhat. With that length work week, again we have more
flexibility for expansion, because the stepping-up of the work week
is easier. If we are already working a 48 or 54 hour week, the
possibility of flexibility to step it up is much more limited. In the
last war we had an average increase in hours per worker of up to
25 to 35 per cent, because we had that flexibility. There is not
that same flexibility in nations which are already working the much
longer work week.
In addition to those broad elements in the labor force. we
have to think:'" of a special problem in wartime, because probably
the most able and the most vigorous of the labor force is drained
into the military service. Also in wartime, the need for particular
kinds of skill is much greater. The shift is to hard goods pro
duction and out of soft goods. The need for mechanical skills is
much greater. But again, those same skills are needed in the
armed forces, and the problem in wartime to get those particular
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skills-to get them

ly difficult.

in the places where they are needed--,-is extreme

The training problem in wartime-the training of the

type of workers which are needed for the particular production line,
is one of the most difficult of the mobilization problem.

In addition we must consider a particular kind of labor group

-the supervisory skills. In our mass production type industry, the

supervisors play a very important role.

Again they are the same

type who make good non-coms and good officers.

They are taken

rapidly, and the upgrading that goes on to get the required super
visory personnel in production, raises very difficult problems.

We

could go on to many other aspects of that, but I have to skim
lightly.

The second major factor is

natural resources.

And again

I want to mention two specifically-agricultural land is the first.

In a war period, the need for food is considerably greater for the

same group of people eating than it is in peacetime.

Believe it or

not, the military consumption of food per capita is considerably

greater than civilian consumption per capita.
in production is to hard goods production.

In wartime the shift

With more vigorous

work, the need of food per person is greater. Again, almost inevit

ably, you have an inflationary pressure during the war.
have more money to spend.

They want more food.

People

For exam

ple, back in 1939 there were about 47 per cent of the families in the

United States whose annual income was one thousand dollars per

year or less.

During the war this average income almost doubled.

I assure you there is considerable room for an expansion of diet

when you start with a family earning a thousand dollars a year.

Hence the need for agricultural land, because of the greater

pressure on agricultural land during a war period, is very great,

and the food problem in war is of very great importance.·

Second, a general group of things you have heard much

about already-materials. Most of the talk of materials before the

40
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last war, and still to a considerable extent today, is in terms of a
group which we call strategic or critical materials. To my mind
they are infinitely less important than another group. No nation
can be a strong industrial· nation and a strong war power without
what I think of as basic materials-steel, copper, aluminum, rubber,
the chemical industry, oil (natural or synthetic), and power. These
are the key materials-the key resources, as far as the war econ
omy is concerned, and to my mind considerably more attention
should be given to the readiness of these material industries in
peace time as a possible preparation for war than to give almost
exclusive concern to the strategic and critical list where stock
piling is the temporary solution.
The third major factor is productive equipment-industrial
plant and machinery. In this country we have a larger volume of
machinery and equipment per worker than in any other country
in the world, an.d it accounts for our very great productivity per
man. Our productivity is about twice that of the highest Euro
pean country. During the war, in .comparison with Russia, we had
about three to four times the productivity per man, and about five
to six times the productivity per man as compared to Japan. That
is largely accounted for by the machinery and equipment which each
man has to use, and also by the skills with which the men are co
ordinated and the production process is integrated. Production
equipment of all kinds is a yery key element, but there is . one in
particular that I want to emphasize. That is the machine tool in
dustry, which makes the machines which produce the goods we
want. We have the largest and most highly efficient machine
tool industry in the world. If we are going to have the possibility of
shifting production lines from one product to another, in which we
have to retool, then if the machine tool industry is not up to snuff,
our flexibility is greatly limited. We have heard the term "armed
in depth". Armed economically in depth is of equal importance,
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·· and for that we need a machine tool industry.

The shift, for ex-' ·

ample, from the B-17 to the B-29 would have been impossible with

out an effective machine tool industry because the tooling had to be

completely different.

Practically all tools, that is the big machine

tools, were scrapped from the B-17 lines when the B-29's came in.
Where rapid shifts are required to improved types of muni

tions, they can be produced only if we have the tools.

If we have

an effective machine tool industry, such shifts can be made rap
idly, as they were.

To my mind, Russia's greatest weakness at the

moment is its lack of a really first class machine tool industry. Dur
ing the last war we provided the bulk of their machine tools.

Today·

they are doing everything possible to get machine tools from us. But

the idea is to have the "know-how" to make the tools, to make the
things we want, and that is a very critical element in our war po
tential.

Another element is the size of our preduction units.

This

question of the size of the largest units, creates all kinds of prob

lems of control of industry, charges of monopoly, and things of that
type.

But in wartime, I can assure you, they are a boon, because

the large production units have a facility for organizing big produc

tion jobs and for integrating all of the steps in the production pro
c�ss.

Giving a contract to a large unit like General Motors means

that you put on the shoulders of General Motors the problem of in
tegrating a production job, in lining up the subcontractors, in lining

up the materials, and getting all the'parts of it tied in together. If
that had to be done almost entirely from a central point, the control

job would be almost impossible; hence time after time, during the

war, many thanks were given for the size of many of our production
units.

A fourth factor, and one of vital importance is managerial,

ability.

This comes down to the skill of integrating the various

42
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other produ�tion factors, in devising. means by which they can· be
made more effective, and. in supervising and integrating the whole
flow of the production process. We are again very fortunate in
our type of economic system to have probably the best·. training
ground possible for the development of ·managers. . Our skill at

management· and oqr management "know-how" are the envy of

the world. Without that "know-how" in management techniques,
our whole system would be considerably less effective. And that
consists, to a very great extent, in the ability to break a job up into

its detailed component parts, .and to be. able to fit men and machines
to a job iii the most effective fashion. Where you have the prob

lem of many l;VOrkers being unskilled and not trained for a particu
lar' job. in war time, the need for breaking each task up· into its sim
plest elements is of even greater importance than in peace time. And

the fact �hat our management techniques, our production techa.
niques of a mass production character, do break complicated jobs up
into simple elements, meant that the problem
of training :workers
.
was considerably easier.

.

.

Finally, one additional point is research-scientific ability,
scientific skills and technological research. "If you don't keep up,
you are lost." At various- times you have heard that phrase. You

have to either be ahead scientifically, o.r lose. New production tech
niques, new weapons, new materials, new ways to substitute for
things· that are scarce, all are a part of the technological scientific
problem which I just want to mention as vital.
Those in general are the fundamental factors, the basic fac
tors, which determine the maximum to which our economy. could go
in reaching its top. How do we attain it? What are the measures
to attain maximum: production in war time? The first thing I want
to point out is that we cannot rely on the type of incentives and
motives that exist in peace time. In peace time, our system is what
we. call "a profit economy". Resources, both human and physic�l,
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move into those lines . of production whic:ti offer the· possibility · of
the greatest return. If a thing is scarce in relation to what people
want, there is a tendency to bid its price up, to make that line more
profitable. Additional firms come into the business or old firms
expand. Perhaps the possibility opens of paying higher wages to
. attract more workers ; hence the incentives for movement of re
sources in a peace time system is the opportunity of greater wages,
greater profits, and a greater return per capita. We cannot rely
. on that in war time. The problem in war time is the shift from
peace time pursuits to munitions production. True, the govern
ment, in buying munitions may quote a. price which offers a better
than�average profit and which enables the new munitions lines to
offer ,higher wages to attract workers. To an extent, that type of
natural or normal incentive �an be used, but it is limited for this
reason. As �e pay more to workers and as equipment gets a great
er return, they have · greater income. But at the. same time re
_sources are shifted. from peace time prod�cts, hence the supply of
those products is reduced. If incomes are higher, people can buy
more. Tlie inevitable result is that the prices of peace time products
will tend to rise, and we are back in the same place we started, be
cause then those producers can raise wages to attract workers and
resources are. attracted back again. Or, it becomes a kind of a
"step" proposition with greater and greater inflation. We cannot
rely solely on the profit motive in war time to get the shift of re
sources needed. Secondly, there is a natural apathy to shift to
munitions industries for a war period of indeterminate length from
a line of work·that you are used to and to which you want to re
turn after the war. No worker with an established home wants
to uproot himself .and his family and move to the new areas of
munitions production, which perhaps are on the coast or far away
from his old home in new areas where housing is not adequate. It
. takes a very major incentive to get those shifts. We have to rely
on something more than the normal incentives of. peace time pro44
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duction. We have to establish central controls, and the controls
have to be operated ·from a central point in order to force the
necessary shifts.
Now what controls are needed, and what is the objective of
the use of such controls? The first stage of the process is the cen
tral plan. In a war time picture, especially today, it is a problem
of planning for the utilization of total resources. It is not sim
ply a question of a military production plan. It is a control plan
for the entire economy, It is a total-control program. The first
stage of it, of course, is the formulation of military requirements
-the traiislation of the strategic and operational plans into logis
tic requirements, and these in turn into production requirements
for the various types of munitions and allied products required. But
in the formulation of the overall plan, I would like to stress very
strongly, that there is great need for integrated individual plans
developed cooperatively and simultaneously, involving three ele
ments-namely, the strategic and logistic elements; second, the
economic elements, involving what resources are available and how
they can be mobilized or utilized; and third, the political elements.
The latter involves questions of what kind of an economy we are
going to have, the degree of belt-tightening possible and still retain
a healthy civilian economy, the possibility of war time and post-war
stability, and the effects of various actions on the ultimate trans.;
ition to the postwar semi-normalcy. The three types of decisions,
the three types of plans must be developed simultaneously, con
currently and. cooperatively; The time wasted in World War II, in
separate planning and in a kind of a resistance towards working
together intimately between the political groups-represented
primarily by the President and Congress-the civilian production
groups�the War Production Board, the Office of War Mobiliza'
tion, etc.-and the military services, cost us a great deal of time and
many- errors. Today, the organization, at least, for mobilization
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planning, the National Security Resources Board and the National
Security Council, provides for that mutual exc'hange. I want to em
phasize very strongly that that is the only way in which the plan·
can be developed most effectively. We must have a unity in the
planning groups and an. intimate interchange of ideas as the basis
on which the total plan is to be developed.·
Even so, the first to be developed must be the military plan:
That, in turn, has to be judged against the availability of resources
of the particular kinds required, when and where, plus the general
political appraisal as to how much and how fast the civilian econ
omy is to 'be disrupted. Perhaps we discover that the military pro
gram can be achieved as it stands. Perhaps modifications are nec
essary, and then it is a process of steady give and take. The size
of the program, military or otherwise, has to be large enough to.
provide a real incentive to get the wheels going hard and fast At
the same time, it can't be so large that we have to commit all of our
resources in a rigid program at once with insufficient flexibility for
later adjustment and change. Change in war time is inevitable. We
have to have some flexibility to make those changes, yet the entire
1;>rogram must be large enough to provide the drive to achieve maxi
mum production. President Roosevelt, in his message in early 1942,
called for the production in 1942 of sixty thousand planes, forty
five thousand tanks, a huge number of ships and other munitions in
balance. He· called for one hundred twenty-five thousand planes
and seventy-five thousand tanks in 1943. These goods were so huge
that everybody practically threw in the sponge until they saw he
meant it, and then they got behind it That was the inceJ.!tive pro
gram, the high goal, that was needed at that stage to really get ac
tion and the economy mobilized. As far as numbers are concerned,
neither goal was achieved. But if you want to add, for instance,
the pounds of aircraft in the type of planes that were in existence
in 1942 when he made the statement, both of those goals were exRESTRICTED
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ceeded by the weight of aircraft actually produced.

But in the in

terval, there were so many changes, such as increased weight of
planes and types of planes, ships and tanks, that as far as the num
bers went, the goals were not reached.

Once a program is established, the control system has to be

geared and meshed into that. That requires a variety of things.
One is a series of limitation orders.

Generally the only way in

which we can get shifts of resources is to prohibit the production
of the things frpm which we want resources to move, so we say,

"No more automobiles." When you can produce no more automobiles,

the automobile manufacturers and workers will willingly produce

munitions.

The first set of controls, then, is limitation orders, either

prohibiting the production of an end-item or §topping the use of

a particular type of material in the end-item which often stops pro

duction.

Second, are established priorities which direct the flow of

components, materials and equipment to particular products which
are most in demand.

If the supply of a material is greater than

the demand for it in high priority stuff, the demands of the key
items can be met . by simple priorities.

As soon, however, as the

total priority demands equal the 'total supply or exceed it, priorities

will no longer do the job of material control. Then you have to in

stitute an allocation system-a detailed precise system of alloca

tions to direct the flow of particular amounts of a material, so
many tons of steel or pounds of aluminum to each particular end use.

When things get even tighter, at. times we have to use also pro

duction scheduling to take into account in more detail the needs
of each particular production line, so that no matter how urgently

the end product is needed, we don't flow more to its production than
can be used.

These comprise a very tight, integrated set of pro-
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duction controls, but a variety of others have to be used to direct
. the economy, such as monetary controls, fiscal controls, price con
trols, rationing and man power controls, and these must be in
tegrated in with the material and resources controls.

Typically, it is easier to control the flow of materials and

to establish programs in terms of a common denominator of ma

terials than in terms of man power or in terms of. price and so on.

These other controls, therefore, must be integrated into the pro
duction control system rather than vice versa.

That integration

was never successful in World War II, and is one that is being

studied very carefully now.

Two other things should be mentioned briefly in the steps

to achieve maximum output. One is, what is the information you

have to have to run this set of controls, this central planning? In

any business you have a detailed accounting system and a set of
internal records.

General statistics are to the economy what ac

counting or bookkeeping data are to an individual business.

But

the problems of obtaining statistical data from the economy as a

whole are infinitely greater and present some of the greatest dif
ficulties in central planning.

Peace time mobilization planning

should keep alive the statistical and informational tools, in order
that decisions can be made most easily when needed.

Finally, the personnel in the central planning group must be

considered.

There is no ideal peace time training to provide per
sonnel for the planning which is needed in war time. The problems
are over-all in character. Most of our business executives think
too narrowly in terms of their own business and its problems. Here
the problem is the integration of steel with machine tools, with
tanks, with ships, with allocations, with rationing, and so on. It

is a broad overall conception. We don't train men that way. They
must, in addition, have great versatility and be able to shift rapid-
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ly from one' problem to another.

Third, they. have to be able to

_work effectiv'ely under pressure, including the intense pressure
of criticism.

They have to be able to make those tough decisions.

They have to have the guts to do it and to do it fast.
to

have

the ability

to

They have

appraise a situation realistically even

though they realize that they can't get all the information that
is needed to make the best decisions.

Nevertheless they must

make the 'decisions with what information they have, and make
them_ fast.

More production men and less salesmen are needed in

The tire problem, one of the meanest during

the lower echelons.

the war, was run by a group of salesmen for a time. Everyone was

dissatisfied., A top-flight production man was recruited and things
cleared right up.

One of the toughest problems therefore, is to

get the right type of personnel to run the top planning effort.

The last general point I want to discuss is, "How large

a proportion· of this total production potential can be devoted to ·

war?" In part, that is a political decision, but one point we have .

to keep clearly in our minds. If the munitions production is to be at

its maximum, there must be a healthy civilian economy and war- ·

supporting economy.

Without it the efficiency of munitions pro

duction will decline., The difficulty is to determine what might be
called the marginal degrees of essentiality of various. parts of the

military, war-supporting and civilian programs and they vary with
the stage of the war effort.

If you take the position of "no

sacrifice for sacrifice sake but only when needed," then in the

earlier stages of a war production effort, the limiting factor is gen-

erally machine tools.
to munitions.
easily.

At that time all machine tools are diverted

Civilian production isn't hurt, but it can't grow

The second stage is generally critical materials-usually

hard material such as steel, copper, aluminum, and zinc.
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stage, the production of civilian hard products is cut. That,
again, does not hurt the standard of living too much. True, civil

ians can't get a new automobile, refrigerator, or radio, but they
can get enough food, clothing, etc.

The real pinch comes when the limiting factor becomes man

power. Then the shortage becomes general. At that stage the most

difficult allocation problems are reached. That is the stage we

had reached early in 1945, and things really looked tough for the
central control agencies. Up to that point the allocation problem was
not impossible.

The difficulty arises because there are no guides which can

be used to determine those degrees of essentiality.

play by ear to judge the problem.

Our most effective instrument

was .what we called the "squealometer".
alllocation

You have to

or program determination,

If in the process of an

we

achieved a uniform

pitch of ''.squeal" from all parties, we thought that the allocation had
been successful.

On the other hand, too often there was an at

tempt to increase pure munitions production at the expense of

the war-supporting activities, and we found that by starving the
railroads of steel plate to make additional tank cars, freight

cars, and box cars, we really ran into trouble in the latter part of
the war.

Then it had to be diverted out of munitions to such uses

in order to keep munitions rolling into the seaports.

At the peak of war production only about forty-five to

forty-eight per cent of steel output was devoted to pure munitions

production, but out of a total of about 65 million tons per year of

finished steel products, probably only about 20
to pure civilian uses.

thousand

tons went

The rest was of a war-supporting charac

ter, going for additional oil production, for rails, for maintenance,

repair, and operating supplies, for war related construction, for
electric power-all required to produce munitions and transport
them.
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,There is one additional point that I" want to make in this
connection. The length of time that is allowed to "reach peak pro
ductic�n is all-important in this type of decision. If there is time,
. it is possible to devote some steel and other critical materials to the
production of additional steel plants. However, it takes about
2½ tons of steel to build the capacity for one additional ton per
year .. · If there is time, it is possible to make the decision to build
more steel capacity. If there is not time, we can't afford to· de'
vote steel for the production of more steel or other types of ma..:
terial. So, time is a critical factor. in those decisions. Only if yeu
have time, is it possible to build more capacity to meet the peak
demands at a later stage.
I am not going to have time to go into the role of the
peace time planning agencies, but I do want to make one or· two final
points here.
I have taiked about the resources to achieve the maximum
potential. I want to emphasize one or two final ones, which seem of
great importance to me. We talk largely about things that per
haps we can put in balance sheets and use to compare one country
with another, such as facilities, materials, and things like that,
_all of which are very important. But, when the real, all-out pinch
comes, the key factors become things which we cannot put into
balance .sheets. Then it comes down to human factors and morale
factors, which include the effectiveness of those who are guiding
both the overall ·effort as well as the segments of that effort in
industry itself; their skill at integrating and coordinating the
production lines ; the brains and intelligence they have ; their skill
in devising production techniques, new ways of saving materials
and things of that kind; their skills to improvise, to substitute,
to find new and better ways of doing things. In other words, it
comes down in part to the effectiveness of management, both in
individual plants and in the central planning agencies.
RESTRICTED·
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss5/1

51
52

RESTRICTED

Naval War College: May 1950 Full Issue

Second, and perhaps more important is the morale of the
working force and the morale of the bosses of production jobs.
Jf their heart is solidly behind the job they are dding, if they
· are convinced that the job they are doing is as important or more
important than anything else, if they have confidence that what
they are producing is going to be used effectively by the military
services and not wasted, the effectiveness of their work will be
greatly enhanced. Their confidence in the use being made of the
products they are producing is vital to the morale and the effective
ness of the production effort. The activities of the services relative

to worker morale in the form of incentive programs· are extremely
important, but there was an awful lot of muttering and grumbling
later in the war in many areas. If the people as a whole are
solidly behind the production effort and morale is high, then in our
type of system, we can really go to town. If morale isn't high,
we will lose some of the power and drive behind that effort. It
comes down to the degree of unity behind the job that they are do
ing. If the people feel no immediate danger of attack and are not
afraid, if they . are seeing in the headlines that things are going
fine, and if they have money in their pockets-more money than
they ever had in · thejr lives before......;.they want to spend it and
they don't want to work in an all-out fashion. That is the time
morale counts in keeping the drive and the pressure behind the
job. In the last analysis wheft the pinch is really on, it's the
morale factor, it's the heart and the will of the people doing the
job that becomes the key factor in our war potential.
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This section lists material published in current periodicals which
will Be of interest and value to Navy officers.

"Stalin's Chestnut Strlllegy"

by Dr. Stefan T. Possony and Lt.Col. W.R. Kinter. Marine
. Corps Gazette. April.
"Bena, Russia's Myster:y o.f Mysteries"

by Edward Crankshaw.The New York Times Magazine.
April 2.
"American Nlllional Strlltegy"
by Rear Admiral Charles R.Brown, USN. U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings. April.
"JJ:'ill We Need A Navy To Win?"

by Captain E. M. Eller, USN. U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings. March.
'The Hyrdogen Bomb"
by Hans Bethe. Scientific American. April.
"A New German-Soviet Pact?'�
by Theodore Draper. The Reporter. April H.
"Jefferson's Republic-The Rediscovery of Democrlllic Philosophy"
by Whitney A. Griswold. Fortune. April.
"China in the Long Hall',.
by Nathaniel Peffer. Harper's. April.
"Breakup of the Two-Power World"
by Walter Lippmann. The Atlantic.April.
"Our Defense Program: Master Plan or Makeshift?"
by Walter Millis. The Yale Review. Spring, 1950.
"Communism and the Asiatic Mind"
by Emanuel Sarkisyanz. The Yale Review. Spring, 1950..
"The Mutual Defense Assistance Program"
· Armed Forces Talk #315.
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